A general notion of algebraic conditional plausibility measures is defined. Probability measures, ranking functions, possibility measures, and (under the appropriate definitions) sets of probability measures can all be viewed as defining algebraic conditional plausibility measures. It is shown that the technology of Bayesian networks can be applied to algebraic conditional plausibility measures.
Introduction
Pearl [1988] among others has long argued that Bayesian networks (that is, the dags without the conditional probability tables) represent important qualitative information about uncertainty regarding conditional dependencies and independencies. To the extent that this is true, Bayesian networks should make perfect sense for non-probabilistic representations of uncertainty. And, indeed, Bayesian networks have been used with κ rankings [Spohn 1988 ] by Darwiche and Goldszmidt [1994] . It follows from results of Wilson [1994] that the technology of Bayesian networks can also be applied to possibility measures [Dubois and Prade 1990] .
The question I address in this paper is "What properties of a representation of uncertainty are required in order for the technology of Bayesian networks to work?" This question too has been addressed in earlier work, see [Darwiche 1992 ; Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992 ; Friedman and Halpern 1995; Wilson 1994] , although the characterization given here is somewhat different. Here I represent uncertainty using plausibility measures, as in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] . To answer the question, I must examine general properties of conditional plausibility as well as defining a notion of plausibilistic independence. Unlike earlier papers, I enforce a symmetry condition in the definition of conditional independence, so that, for example, A is independent of B iff B is independent of A. While this property holds for probability, under the asymmetric definition of independence used in earlier work it does not necessarily hold for other formalisms. There are also subtle but important differences between this paper and [Friedman and Halpern 1995] in the notion of conditional plausibility. The definitions here are simpler but more general; particular attention is paid here to conditions on when the conditional plausibility must be defined.
The major results here are a general condition, simpler than that given in [Friedman and Halpern 1995; Wilson 1994] , under which a conditional plausibility measure satisfies the semi-graphoid properties (which means it can be represented using a Bayesian network). Conditions are also given that suffice for a Bayesian network to be able to quantatively represent a plausibility measure; more precisely, conditions are given so that a plausibility measure can be uniquely reconstructed given conditional plausibility tables for each node in the Bayesian network. Conditions for quantitative representation by Bayesian networks do not seem to have been presented in the literature for representations of uncertainty other than probability (for which the conditions are trivial). A minor additional condition also suffices to guarantee that d-separation in the network characterizes conditional independence. All these conditions clearly apply to κ rankings and possibility measures. Perhaps more interestingly, they also apply to sets of probabilities under a novel representation of such sets as a plausibility measure. This novel representation (and the associated notion of conditioning) is shown to have some natural properties not shared by other representations.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I discuss conditional plausibility measures. Section 3 introduces algebraic conditional plausibility measures, which are ones where there is essentially an analogue to + and ×. (Putting such an algebraic structure on uncertainty is not new; it was also done in [Darwiche 1992 ; Darwiche and Ginsberg 1992; Friedman and Halpern 1995; Weydert 1994] .) Section 4 discusses independence and conditional independence in conditional plausibility spaces, and shows that algebraic conditional plausibility measures satisfy the semi-graphoid properties. Finally, in Section 5, Bayesian networks based on (algebraic) plausibility measures are considered. Combining the fact that algebraic plausibility measures satisfy the semi-graphoid properties with the results of , it follows that d-separation in a Bayesian network G implies conditional independence for all algebraic plausibility measures compatible with G; a weak richness condition is shown to yield the converse. The paper concludes in Section 6. Longer proofs are relegated to the appendix.
Conditional Plausibility

Unconditional Plausibility Measures
Before getting to conditional plausibility measures, it is perhaps best to consider unconditional plausibliitiy measures. The basic idea behind plausibility measures is straightforward. A probability measure maps subsets of a set W to [0, 1] . Its domain may not consist of all subsets of W ; however, it is required to be an algebra. (Recall that an algebra F over W is a set of subsets of W containing W and closed under union and complementation, so that if U, V ∈ F, then so are U ∪ V and U .) A plausibility measure is more general; it maps elements in an algebra F to some arbitrary partially ordered set. If Pl is a plausibility measure, then we read Pl(U ) as "the plausibility of set U ". If Pl(U ) ≤ Pl (V ) , then V is at least as plausible as U . Because the ordering is partial, it could be that the plausibility of two different sets is incomparable. An agent may not be prepared to say of two sets that one is more likely than another or that they are equal in likelihood.
Formally, a plausibility space is a tuple S = (W, F, Pl), where W is a set of worlds, F is an algebra over W , and Pl maps sets in F to some set D of plausibility values partially ordered by a relation ≤ D (so that ≤ D is reflexive, transitive, and anti-symmetric) that contains two special elements ⊤ D and ⊥ D such that ⊥ D ≤ D d ≤ D ⊤ D for all d ∈ D; these are intended to be the analogues of 1 and 0 for probability. As usual, the ordering is defined There are three requirements on plausibility measures. The first two are obvious analogues of requirements that hold for other notions of uncertainty: the whole space gets the maximum plausibility and the empty set gets the minimum plausibility. The third requirement says that a set must be at least as plausible as any of its subsets.
(In Pl3, I am implicitly assuming that U, U ′ ∈ F. Similar assumptions are made throughout.)
All the standard representations of uncertainty in the literature can be represented as plausibility measures. I briefly describe some other representations of uncertainty that will be of relevance to this paper.
Sets of probabilities:
One common way of representing uncertainty is by a set of probability measures. This set is often assumed to be convex (see, for example, [Campos and Moral 1995; Cousa, Moral, and Walley 1999; Gilboa and Schmeidler 1993; Levi 1985; Walley 1991] for discussion and further references), however, convex sets do not seem appropriate for representing independence assumptions, so I do not make this restriction here. For example, if a coin with an unknown probability of heads is tossed twice, and the tosses are known to be independent, it seems that a reasonable representation is given by the set P 0 consisting of all measures µ α , where µ α (hh) = α 2 , µ α (ht) = µ α (th) = α(1 − α), µ α (tt) = (1 − α) 2 . Unfortunately, P 0 is not convex. Moreover, its convex hull includes many measures for which the coin tosses are not independent. It is argued in [Cousa, Moral, and Walley 1999 ] that a set of probability measures is behaviorally equivalent to its convex hull. However, even if we accept this argument, it does not follow that a set and its convex hull are equivalent insofar as determination of independencies goes.
There are a number of ways of viewing a set P of probability measures as a plausibility measure. One uses the lower probability P * , defined as P * (U ) = inf{µ(U ) : µ ∈ P}. Clearly P * satisfies Pl1-3. The corresponding upper probability P * , defined as P * (U ) = sup{µ : µ ∈ P} = 1 − P * (U ), is also clearly a plausibility measure.
Both P * and P * give a way of comparing the likelihood of two subsets U and V of W . These two ways are incomparable; it is easy to find a set P of probability measures on W and subsets U and V of W such that P * (U ) < P * (V ) and P * (U ) > P * (V ) . Rather than choosing between P * and P * , we can associate a different plausibility measure with P that captures both. Let
This puts a partial order on D P * ,P * ; clearly ⊥ D P * ,P * = (0, 0) and ⊤ D P * ,P * = (1, 1). Define Pl P * ,P * (U ) = (P * (U ), P * (U )). Thus, Pl P * ,P * associates with a set U two numbers which can be thought of as defining an interval in terms of the lower and upper probability of U . It is easy to check that Pl P * ,P * (U ) ≤ Pl P * ,P * (V ) if the upper probability of U is less than or equal to the lower probability of V . Pl P * ,P * satisfies Pl1-3, so it is indeed a plausibility measure, but one which puts only a partial order on events.
The trouble with P * , P * , and even Pl P * ,P * is that they lose information. For example, it is not hard to find a set P of probability measures and subsets U, V of W such that µ(U ) ≤ µ(V ) for all µ ∈ P and µ(U ) < µ(V ) for some µ ∈ P, but P * (U ) = P * (V ) and P * (U ) = P * (V ). Indeed, there exists an infinite set P of probability measures such that µ(U ) < µ(V ) for all µ ∈ P but P * (U ) = P * (V ) and P * (U ) = P * (V ) . If all the probability measures in P agree that U is less likely than V , it seems reasonable to conclude that U is less likely than V . However, none of P * , P * , or Pl P * ,P * will necessarily draw this conclusion.
Fortunately, it is not hard to associate yet another plausibility measure with P that does not lose this important information. For technical convenience that will become clear later, assume that there is some index set I such that P = {µ i : i ∈ I}. Thus, for example, if P = {µ 1 , . . . , µ n }, then I = {1, . . . , n}. Let D I = [0, 1] I , that is, the functions from I to [0, 1] , with the pointwise ordering, so that f ≤ g iff f (i) ≤ g(i) for all i ∈ I. 1 It is easy to check that ⊥ D I is the function f : I → [0, 1] such that f (i) = 0 for all i ∈ I and ⊤ D I is the function g such that g(i) = 1 for all i ∈ I. For U ⊆ W , let f U be the function such that f U (i) = µ i (U ) for all i ∈ I. For example, for the set P 0 of measures representing the two coin tosses (which is indexed by IR), the set W can be taken to be {hh, ht, tt, th}. Then, for example, f {hh} (alpha) = µ α (hh) = α 2 and f {ht,tt} (α) = 1 − α.
It is easy to see that
Pl P captures all the information in P (unlike, say, P * , which washes much of it away by taking infs).
This way of associating a plausibility measure with a set P of probability measures generalizes: it provides a way of associating a single plausibility measure with any set of plausibility measures; I leave the straightforward details to the reader.
Possibility measures:
A possibility measure Poss on W is a function mapping subsets of W to [0, 1] such that Poss(W ) = 1, Poss(∅) = 0, and Poss(U ) = sup w∈U (Poss({w})), so that Poss(U ∪ V ) = max(Poss(U ), Poss(V )) [ Dubois and Prade 1990] . Clearly a possibility measure is a plausibility measure.
Ranking functions: An ordinal ranking (or κ-ranking or ranking function) κ on W (as defined by [Goldszmidt and Pearl 1992] , based on ideas that go back to [Spohn 1988] ) is a function mapping subsets of W to IN * = IN ∪ {∞} such that κ(W ) = 0, κ(∅) = ∞, and κ(U ) = min w∈U (κ({w})), so that κ(U ∪ V ) = min(κ(U ), κ(V )). Intuitively, a ranking function assigns a degree of surprise to each subset of worlds in W , where 0 means unsurprising and higher numbers denote greater surprise. It is easy to see that if κ is a ranking function on W , then (W, 2 W , κ) is a plausibility space, where x ≤ IN * y if and only if y ≤ x under the usual ordering on the natural numbers. One standard view of a ranking function, going back to Spohn, is that a ranking of k can be associated with a probability of ǫ k , for some fixed (possibly infinitesimal) ǫ. Note that this viewpoint justifies taking κ(W ) = 0, κ(∅) = ∞, and κ(U ∪ V ) = min(κ(U ), κ(V )).
Conditional Plausibility Measures
Since Bayesian networks make such heavy use of conditioning, my interest here is not just plausibility measures, but conditional plausibility measures (cpm's). Given a set W of worlds, a cpm maps pairs of subsets of W to some partially ordered set D. I write Pl(U |V ) rather than Pl(U, V ), in keeping with standard notation for conditioning. In the case of a probability measure µ, it is standard to take µ(U |V ) to be undefined in µ(V ) = 0. In general, we must make precise what the allowable second arguments are. Thus, I take the domain of a cpm to have the form F × F ′ where, intuitively, F ′ consists of those sets in F on which it makes sense to condition. For example, if we start with an unconditional probability measure µ, F ′ might consist of all sets V such that µ(V ) > 0. (Note that F ′ is not an algebra-it is not closed under either intersection or complementation.) A Popper algebra over W is a set F × F ′ of subsets of W × W satisfying the following properties: Acc1. F is an algebra over W .
Acc2. F ′ is a nonempty subset of F.
(Popper algebras are named after Karl Popper, who was the first to consider formally conditional probability as the basic notion [Popper 1968 ]. De Finetti [1936] also did some early work, apparently independently, taking conditional probabilities as primitive. Indeed, as Rényi [1964] points out, the idea seems to go back as far as Keynes [1921] .) A conditional plausibility space (cps) is a tuple (W, F, F ′ , Pl), where F × F ′ is a Popper algebra over W , Pl : F × F ′ → D, D is a partially ordered set of plausibility values, and Pl is a conditional plausibility measure (cpm) that satisfies the following conditions:
CPl1-3 are the obvious analogues to Pl1-3. CPl4 is a minimal property that guarantees that when conditioning on V , everything is relativized to V . It follows easily from CPl1-4 thatx Pl(·|V ) is a plausibility measure on V for each fixed V . A cps is acceptable if it satisfies
Acceptability is a generalization of the observation that if Pr(V ) = 0, then then conditioning on V should be defined. It says that if Pl(U |V ) = ⊥ D , then conditioning on V ∩ U should be defined.
This notion of cps is closely related to that defined in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] . There, a conditional plausibility space is defined to be a family {W, D V , Pl V ) : V ⊆ W } of plausibility spaces that satisfies the following coherence condition, which relates conditioning on two different sets, where F = 2 W and F ′ = 2 W − {∅}:
It is not hard to show that CPl5 implies CPl4.
Lemma 2.1: CPl5 implies CPl4.
Proof: Since clearly Pl(U ∩V |V ) = Pl(U ∩V ∩V |V ), by CPl5 it follows that Pl(U |V ∩V ) = Pl(U ∩ V |V ∩ V ), and hence Pl(U |V ) = Pl(U ∩ V |V ).
CPl5 does not follow from CPl1-4 (indeed, as shown below, the standard notion of conditioning for lower probabilities satisfies CPl1-4 but not CPl5). A cps that satisfies CPl5 is said to be coherent. Although I do not assume CPl5 here, it in fact holds for all plausibility measures to which one of the main results applies (see Lemma 3.4).
To distinguish the definition of cps given in this paper from that given in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] , I call the latter an FH-cps. There is no analogue to Acc1-4 in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] ; F is implicitly taken to be 2 W , while F ′ is implicitly taken to be 2 W − {∅}. This is an inessential difference betwen the definitions. More significantly, note that in an FH-cps, (W, D V , Pl V ) is a plausibility space for each fixed V , and thus satisfies Pl1-3. However, requiring CPl1-3 is a priori stronger than requiring Pl1-3 for each separate plausibility space. Pl1 requires that Pl(∅|V ) = ⊥ D V , but the elements ⊥ D V may be different for each V . By way of contrast, CPl1 requires that Pl(⊥|V ) must be the same element, ⊥ D , for all V . Similar remarks hold for Pl2. Nevertheless, as is shown below, there is a construction that converts an FH-cps to a coherent cps.
I now consider some standard ways of getting a cps starting with an unconditional representation of uncertainty. A cpm Pl extends an unconditional plausibility measure Pl
All the constructions given below result in extensions.
Ranking functions: Given an unconditional ranking function κ, there is a well-known way of extending it to a conditional ranking function:
This is consistent with the view that if V ) . It is easy to check that this definition results in a coherent cps.
Possibility measures: There are two standard ways of defining a conditional possibility measure from an unconditional possibility measure Poss. To distinguish them, I write Poss(U |V ) for the first approach and Poss(U ||V ) for the second approach. According to the first approach,
The second approach looks more like conditioning in probability:
It is easy to show that both definitions result in a coherent cps. (Many other notions of conditioning for possibility measures can be defined; see, for example [Fonck 1994 ]. I focus on these two because they are the ones most-often considered in the literature.)
Sets of probabilities: For a set P of probabilities, conditioning can be defined for all the representations of P as a plausibility measure. But in each case there are subtle choices involving when conditioning is undefined. For example, one definition of conditional lower probability is that P * (U |V ) is inf{µ(U |V ) : µ(V ) = 0} if µ(V ) = 0 for all µ ∈ P, and is undefined otherwise (i.e., if µ(V ) = 0 for some µ ∈ P). It is easy to check that P * defined this way gives a coherent cpm, as does the corresponding definition of P * . The problem with this definition is that it may result in a rather small set F ′ for which conditioning is defined. For example, if for each set V = W , there is some measure µ ∈ P such that µ(V ) = 0 (which can certainly happen in some nontrivial examples), then F ′ = {W }. As a consequence, the cps defined in this way is not acceptable (i.e., does not satisfy Acc4) in general.
The following definition gives a lower probability which is defined on more arguments:
It is easy to see that this definition agrees with the first one whenever the first is defined and results, in general, in a larger set F ′ . Moreover, the resulting cps is acceptable. However, the second definition does not satisfy CPl5. For example, suppose that W = {a, b, c} and
Taking V = {a, b}, U = {a}, and U ′ = {b}, it is easy to see that according to the second definition,
For Pl P , there are two analogous definitions. For the first, Pl P (U |V ) is defined only if µ(V ) > 0 for all µ ∈ P, in which case Pl P (U |V ) is f U |V , where f U |V (i) = µ i (U |V ). This definition gives a coherent cps, but again, in general, not one that is acceptable. In this paper, I focus on the following definition, which does result in an acceptable cps.
First extend D I by allowing functions which have value * (intuitively, * denotes undefined). More precisely, let D ′ I consist of all functions f from I to [0, 1]∪{ * } such that f (i) = * for at least one i ∈ I. The idea is to define Pl P (U |V ) = f U |V , where f U |V (i) = µ i (U |V ) if µ i (V ) > 0 and * otherwise. (Note that this agrees with the previous definition, which applies only to the situation where µ(V ) > 0 for all µ ∈ P.) There is a problem though, one to which I have already alluded. CPl1 says that f ∅|V must be ⊥ for all V . Thus, it must be the case that
A similar problem arises with CPl2.
To deal with this problem D ′ I must be slightly modified. 
I by taking f ≤ g if one of the following three conditions holds:
and for all i ∈ I, either f (i) = g(i) = * or f (i) = * , g(i) = * , and f (i) ≤ g(i).
Now define
It is easy to check that this gives a coherent cps.
Plausibility measures:
The construction for Pl P can be used to convert any FH-cps to a cps. I demonstrate the idea by showing how to construct a conditional plausibility measure from an unconditional plausibility measure. Given an unconditional plausibility space (W, F, Pl) with range D, an FH-cps is constructed in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] by defining Pl(
. This is not a cps because CPl2 is not satisfied, but it is an FH-cps, since Pl1-3 is satisfied for each fixed V , and so is CPl5. As observed in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] , this is in fact the FH-cps extending Pl that makes the minimal number of comparisons, in the sense that if Pl ′ is an FH-cps extending Pl and Pl 
To get a cps, let
I leave it to the reader to check that Pl is a coherent cpm. It is important that Pl(U |V ) is undefined if Pl(V ) = ⊥ D ; if we tried to extend the construction to V such that Pl(V ) = ⊥ D , then we would have ⊤ D * = ⊥ D * . This issue did not arise in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] , since there were separate plausibility spaces for each choice of V .
These constructions for extending an unconditional measure of likelihood to a cps have a property that will prove useful in stating some of the technical result. A cps (W, F, F ′ , Pl) is standard if F ′ = {U : Pl(U ) = ⊥}. Note that all the constructions of cps's given above result in standard cps's.
Algebraic Conditional Plausibility Measures
To be able to carry out the type of reasoning used in Bayesian networks, it does not suffice to just have conditional plausibility. We need to have analogues of addition and multiplication. More precisely, there needs to be some way of computing the plausibility of the union of two disjoint sets in terms of the plausibility of the individual sets and a way of computing 
and Dom Pl (⊗); in the sequel, I omit the subscript Pl if it is clear from context.)
I sometimes refer to the cpm Pl as being algebraic as well. It may seem more natural to consider a stronger version of Alg4 that applies to all pairs in D × D, such as
However, as Proposition 3.1 below shows, by requiring that Alg3 and Alg4 hold only for tuples in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) rather than on all tuples in D × D, some cps's of interest become algebraic that would otherwise not be. Intuitively, we care about ⊗ mainly to the extent that Alg1 and Alg2 holds, and Alg1 and Alg2 apply only to tuples in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), respectively. Thus, it does not seem unreasonable that Alg4 be required to hold only for these tuples.
Proposition 3.1: The constructions for extending an unconditional probability measure, ranking function, possibility measure (using either Poss(U |V ) or Poss(U ||V )), and the plausibility measure Pl P defined by a set P of probability measures to a cps result in algebraic cps 's. 3 Proof: It is easy to see that in each case the cps is acceptable. It is also easy to find appropriate notions of ⊗ and ⊕ in the case of probability measures, ranking functions, and 2. In the conference version of this paper, Dom(⊕) was taken to consist only of pairs, not tuples of arbitrary finite length, and distributivity was considered only for terms of the form a ⊗ (b ⊕ b ′ ). The more general version considered here is slightly stronger. The reason is that it is possible that (a, b1
Note also that only left distribituvity is required here. 3. Essentially the same result is proved in [Friedman and Halpern 1995] for all cases but PlP . possibility measures using Poss(U ||V ). For probability, clearly ⊕ and ⊗ are essentially + and ×; however, since the range of probability is [0, 1] , a⊕b must be defined as max (1, a+b) , and Alg3 holds only for Dom(⊕) = {(a 1 , . . . , a k ) :
For ranking, ⊕ and ⊗ are min and +; there are no constraints on Dom(min) and Dom(+). For Poss(U ||V ), ⊕ is max and ⊗ is ×; again, there are no constraints on Dom(max) and Dom(×). I leave it to the reader to check that Alg1-4 hold in all these cases.
For Poss(U |V ), ⊕ is again max and ⊗ is min. There are no constraints on Dom(max);
It is easy to check Alg1-3. While min does not satisfy Alg4 ′ -certainly min(a, c) = min(b, c) does not in general imply that a = b-Alg4 does hold. For if min(a, c) ≤ min(b, c) and a = 1, then clearly b = 1. Alternatively, if a < c, then min(a, c) = a and the only way that
Finally, for Pl P , ⊕ and ⊗ are essentially pointwise addition and multiplication. But there are a few subtleties. As in the case of probability, Dom(⊕) consists of sequences which sum to at most 1 for each index i. Care must also be taken in dealing with
(taking * × a = a × * = 0 if a = * and * × * = * ). It is important that * × 0 = 0 and * × * = * since otherwise Alg3 may not hold. For example, according to Alg3,
) and, similarly, ((1/2, * , 1/2)⊗(a, * , b))⊕((1/2, * , 1/2))⊗ (a, * , b)) = (a, * , b). Since * × 0 = 0 and * × * = * , these equalities hold. I leave it to the reader to check that, with these definitions, Alg1-4 hold (although note that the restrictions to Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗) are required for both Alg3 and Alg4 to hold).
Conditional lower probability is not algebraic. For example, it is not hard to construct pairwise disjoint sets U 1 , V 1 , U 2 , and V 2 and a set P of probability measures such that
That means there cannot be a function ⊕ in the case of lower probability.
For later convenience, I list some simple properties of algebraic cpms'sthat show that ⊥ and ⊤ act like 0 and 1 with respect to addition and multiplication. Let Range(Pl) = {d :
Proof: Suppose that d = Pl(U |V ). By Alg1, it follows that
Proof: Suppose that d = Pl(U |V ). By Alg2, CPl2, and CPl4, it follows that
If d = ⊥, then by Alg2, CPl1, and CPl4
Replacing U with V ∩ V ′ , the same argument shows that ⊤ ⊗ ⊥ = ⊥; replacing U with ∅, we get that ⊥ ⊗ ⊥ = ⊥. Proof: Suppose that (W, F, F ′ , Pl) is a standard algebraic cps and that
, then it follows from Alg2 and monotonicity that
. (1) For the opposite implication, suppose that Pl(
Since V ∩V ′ ∈ F ′ and the cps is standard, it must be the case that Pl(
Independence
How can we capture formally the notion that two events are independent? Intuitively, it means that they have nothing to do with each other-they are totally unrelated; the occurrence of one has no influence on the other. None of the representations of uncertainty that we have been considering can express the notion of "unrelatedness" (whatever it might mean) directly. The best we can do is to capture the "footprint" of independence on the notion. For example, in the case of probability, if U and V are unrelated, it seems reasonable to expect that learning U should not affect the probability of V and symmetrically, learning V should not affect the probability of U . "Unrelatedness" is, after all, a symmetric notion. 4 The fact that U and V are probabilistically independent (with respect to probability measure µ) can thus be expressed as µ(U |V ) = µ(U ) and µ(V |U ) = µ(V ). There is a technical problem with this definition: What happens if µ(V ) = 0? In that case µ(U |V ) is undefined. Similarly, if µ(U ) = 0 then µ(V |U ) is undefined. It is conventional to say that, in this case, U and V are still independent. This leads to the following formal definition.
Definition 4.1: U and V are probabilistically independent (with respect to probability measure µ) if µ(V ) = 0 implies µ(U |V ) = µ(U ) and µ(U ) = 0 implies µ(V |U ) = µ(V ).
This does not look like the standard definition of independence in texts, but an easy calculation shows that it is equivalent.
Proposition 4.2:
The following are equivalent:
Thus, in the case of probability, it would be equivalent to say that U and V are independent with respect to µ if µ(U ∩ V ) = µ(U )µ (V ) or to require only that µ(U |V ) = µ(U ) if µ(V ) = 0 without requiring that µ(V |U ) = µ(V ) if µ(U ) = 0. However, these equivalences do not necessarily hold for other representations of uncertainty. The definition of independence I have given here seems to generalize more appropriately. 5 The definition of probabilistic conditional independence is analogous.
Definition 4.3: U and V are probabilistically independent given V ′ (with respect to proba-
It is immediate that U and V are (probabilistically) independent iff they are independent conditional on W . The generalization to conditional plausibility measures (and hence to all other representations of uncertainty that we have been considering) is straightforward.
Definition 4.4 : Given a cps (W, F, F ′ , Pl), U, V ∈ F are plausibilistically independent given V ′ ∈ F (with respect to the cpm Pl), written
We are interested in conditional independence of random variables as well as in conditional independence of events. All the standard definitions extend to plausibility in a straightforward way. A random variable X on W is a function from W to the reals. Let R(X) be the set of possible values for X (that is, the set of values over which X ranges). As usual, X = x is the event {w : X(w) = x}. If X = {X 1 , . . . , X k } is a set of random variables and x = (x 1 , . . . , x k ), let X = x be an abbreviation for the event
A random variable is measurable with respect to cps (W, F, F ′ , Pl) if X = x ∈ F for all x ∈ R(X). For the rest of the paper, I assume that all random variables X are measurable and that R(X) is finite for all random variables X. Random variables X and Y are independent with respect to plausibility measure Pl if the events X = x and Y = y are independent for all x ∈ R(X) and y ∈ R(Y ). More generally, given sets X, Y, and Z of random variables, X and Y are plausibilistically independent given Z (with respect to Pl), denoted I rv Pl (X, Y|Z), if I Pl (X = x, Y = x|Z = z) for all x, y, and z. (Note that I am using I Pl for conditional independence of events and I rv Pl for conditional independence of random variables.) If Z = ∅, then I rv Pl (X, Y|Z) if X and Y are unconditionally independent, that is, if I Pl (X = x, Y = x|W ) for all x, y; if either X = ∅ or Y = ∅, then I rv Pl (X, Y|Z) is taken to be vacuously true. Now consider the following four properties of random variables, called the semi-graphoid properties [Pearl 1988 ], where X, Y, and Z are pairwise disjoint sets of variables.
CIRV1. If I rv
Pl (X, Y|Z) then I rv Pl (Y, X|Z).
5. Another property of probabilistic independence is that if U is independent of V then U is independent of V . This too does not follow for the other representations of uncertainty, and Walley [1991] actually makes this part of his definition. Adding this requirement would not affect any of the results here, although it would make the proofs somewhat lengthier, so I have not made it part of the definition.
CIRV3. If
It is well known that CIRV1-4 hold for probability measures. The following result generalizes this. The proof is not difficult, although care must be taken to show that the result depends only on the properties of algebraic cpms.
Theorem 4.5: CIRV1-4 hold for all algebraic cps's.
Proof: See the appendix.
Theorem 4.5, of course, is very dependent on the definition of conditional independence given here. Other notions of independence have been studied in the literature for specific representations of uncertainty. Perhaps the most common defines tries to generalize the observation that if U and V are probabilistically independent, then µ(U ∩V ) = µ(U )×µ (V ) . Zadeh [1978] considered this approach in the context of possibility measures, calling it noninteractivity, but it clearly makes sense for any algebraic cpm.
Definition 4.6: U and V do not interact given V ′ (with respect to the algebraic cpm Pl
Fonck [1994] shows that noninteraction is strictly weaker than independence for a number of notions of independence for possibility measures. The following result shows that noninteraction implies independence for all algebraic cpms.
On the other hand, if
What about the converse to Lemma 4.7? The results of Fonck show that it does not hold in general-indeed, it does not hold for Poss(U |V ). So what is required for noninteractivity to imply independence? The following lemma provides a sufficient condition.
6. Shenoy [1994] defines a notion similar in spirit to noninteractivity for random variables.
, it follows from Lemma 3.3 that Pl(V |V ′ ) = ⊥. So, by Alg4 ′ , (2), and (3), it follows that Pl(
Lemmas 4.7 and 4.8 show why noninteractivity and independence coincide for conditional probability defined from unconditional probability, ranking functions, and possibility measures using Poss(U ||V ). Moreover, they suggest why they do not coincide in general. Since neither Poss(U |V ) nor Pl P satisfy Alg4 ′ , it is perhaps not surprising that in neither case does noninteractivity imply conditional independence. (We shall shortly see an example in the case of Pl P ; Fonck [1994] gives examples in the case of Poss(U |V ).) Indeed, noninteractivity may not even imply conditional independence for an arbitrary conditional probability measure, as the following example shows.
It is easy to see that {b} is not independent of itself, but {b} does not interact with {b}, since µ(b) = µ(b) × µ(b). Nevertheless, it is not hard to check that this conditional probability measure µ is algebraic and, in fact, satisfies Alg4 ′′ . However, it is not standard, since {b} ∈ F ′ although µ(b) = 0.
It is easy to see that the assumption of standardness is necessary in Lemma 4.8. For suppose that (W, F, F ′ , Pl) is an arbitrary nonstandard algebraic cps for which ⊤ = ⊥. Since (W, F, F ′ , Pl) is nonstandard, there must exist some U ∈ F ′ such that Pl(U |W ) = ⊥.
In general, Theorem 4.5 does not hold if we use NI Pl rather than I Pl . Besides noninteractivity, a number of different approaches to defining independence for possibility measures [Campos and Huete 1999a; Campos and Huete 1999b; Dubois, Fariñas del Cerro, Herzig, and Prade 1994; Fonck 1994] and for sets of probability measures [Campos and Huete 1993; Campos and Moral 1995; Cousa, Moral, and Walley 1999] have been considered. In general, Theorem 4.5 does not hold for them either. It is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss and compare these approaches to that considered here, but it is instructive to consider independence for sets of probability measures in a little more detail, especially for the representation Pl P .
I Pl P is very close to a notion called type-1 independence considered by de Campos and Moral [1995] . U and V are type-1 independent conditional on V ′ with respect to P if U and V are independent conditional on V ′ with respect to every µ ∈ P. It is easy to check that I Pl P (U, V |V ′ ) implies that U and V are type-1 independent conditional on V ′ (and similarly for random variables); however, the converse does not necessarily hold, because the two approaches treat conditioning on events that have probability 0 according to some (but not all) of the measures in P differently. To see this, consider an example discussed by de Campos and Moral . Suppose a coin is known to be either double-headed or doubletailed and is tossed twice. This can be represented by P = {µ 0 , µ 1 }, where µ 0 (hh) = 1 and µ 0 (ht) = µ 0 (th) = µ 0 (tt) = 0, while µ 1 (tt) = 1 and µ 1 (ht) = µ 1 (th) = µ(hh) = 0. Let X 1 and X 2 be the random variables representing the outcome of the first and second coin tosses, respectively. Clearly there is a functional dependence between X 1 and X 2 , but it is easy to check that X 1 and X 2 are type-1 independent with respect to P. Moreover, noninteractivity holds: NI Pl (X 1 = i, X 2 = j) holds for i, j ∈ {h, t}. On the other hand, I Pl P (X 1 , X 2 ) does not hold. For example, f X 1 =h (1) = 0 while f X 1 =h|X 2 =h (1) = * . 7
Bayesian Networks
Throughout this section, I assume that we start with a set W of possible worlds characterized by a set X = {X 1 , . . . , X n } of n binary random variables. That is, a world in W is a tuple (x 1 , . . . , x n ) with x i ∈ {0, 1}, and X i (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = x i ; that is, the value of X i in world w = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) = w i . 8 The goal of this section is to show that many of the tools of Bayesian network technology can be applied in this setting. The proofs of the main results all proceed in essentially the same spirit as well-known results for probabilistic Bayesian networks (see [Geiger and Pearl 1988; Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 1990; Verma 1986 ]).
Qualitative Bayesian Networks
As usual, a (qualitative) Bayesian network (over X ) is a dag whose nodes are labeled by variables in X . The standard notion of a Bayesian network representing a probability measure [Pearl 1988 ] can be generalized in the obvious way to plausibility.
Definition 5.1: Given a qualitative Bayesian network G, let Par G (X) be the parents of the random variable X in G; let Des G (X) be all the descendants of X, that is, X and all those nodes Y such that X is an ancestor of Y ; let ND G (X), the nondescendants of X, consist of X − Des G (X). Note that all ancestors of X are nondescendants of X. The Bayesian network G is compatible with the cps (W, F, F ′ , Pl) (or just compatible with Pl, if the other 7. As Peter Walley [private communication, 2000] points out, this example is somewhat misleading. The definition of independence with respect to PlP produces the same counterintuitive behavior as type-1 independence if the probabilities are modified slightly so as to make them positive, i.e., when there is "almost functional dependence" between the two variables. For example, suppose that the coin in the example is known to either land heads with probability .99 or .01 (rather than 1 and 0, as in the example). Let µ ′ 0 and µ ′ 1 be the obvious modifications of µ0 and µ1 required to represent this situation, and let
It is easy to check that X1 and X2 continue to be type-1 independent, and noninteractivity continues to hold, but now I Pl P ′ (X1, X2) also holds. The real problem is that this representation of uncertainty does not enable learning. 8. The assumption that the random variables are binary is just for ease of exposition. It is easy to generalize the results to the case where R(Xi) is finite for each Xi.
components of the cps are clear from context) if I rv Pl (X, ND G (X)|Par(X)), that is, if X is conditionally independent of its nondescendants given its parents, for all X ∈ X .
There is a standard way of constructing a Bayesian network that represents a probability measure [Pearl 1988 ]. I briefly review the construction here, since it works without change for an algebraic cpm. Given an algebraic cpm Pl, let Y 1 , . . . , Y n be a permutation of the random variables in X . Construct a qualitative Bayesian network G Pl, Y 1 ,...,Yn as follows: For each k, find a minimal subset of {Y 1 , . . . , Y k−1 }, call it P k , such that
Then add edges from each of the nodes in P k to Y k . Verma [1986] shows that this construction gives a Bayesian network that is compatible with Pl in the case that Pl is a probability measure; his proof depends only on CIRV1-4. Thus, the construction works for algebraic cpms. Proof: For ease of notation in the proof, I write G instead of G Pl, Y 1 ,...,Yn . Note that Y 1 , . . . , Y n represents a topological sort of G; edges always go from nodes in {Y 1 , . . . , Y k−1 } to Y k . It follows that G is acyclic; i.e., it is a dag. The construction guarantees that
It follows from results of [Verma 1986 ] (and is not hard to verify directly) that
can be proved using only CIRV1-4. The result now follows from Theorem 4.5.
Quantitative Bayesian Networks
A qualitative Bayesian network G gives qualitative information about dependence and independence, but does not actually give the values of the conditional plausibilities. To provide the more quantitative information, we associate with each node X in G a conditional plausibility table (cpt) that quantifies the effects of the parents of X on X. A cpt for X gives, for each setting of X's parents in G, the plausibility that X = 0 and X = 1 given that setting. For example, if X's parents in G are Y and Z, then the cpt for X would have an entry denoted d X=i|Y =j∩Z=k for all (i, j, k) ∈ {0, 1} 3 . As the notation is meant to suggest, d X=i|Y =j∩Z=k = Pl(X = i|Y = j ∩ Z = k) for the plausibility measure Pl represented by G. 9 For each fixed j and k, we assume that x 0jk ⊕ x 1jk = ⊤. A quantitative Bayesian network is a pair (G, f ) consisting of a qualitative Bayesian network G and a function f that associates with each node X in G a cpt for X. Definition 5.3: A quantitative Bayesian network (G, f ) represents Pl if G is compatible with Pl and the cpts agree with Pl, in the sense that, for each random variable X, the entry
Given a cpm Pl, it is easy to construct a quantitative Bayesian network (G, f ) that represents Pl: simply construct G that is compatible with Pl as in Theorem 5.2 and define f appropriately, using Pl. The more interesting question is whether there is a unique 9. Of course, if the random variables are not binary, i, j, k have to range over all possible values for the random variables.
algebraic cpm determined by a quantitative Bayesian network. As stated, this question is somewhat undetermined. The numbers in a quantitative network do not say what ⊕ and ⊗ ought to be for the algebraic cpm. A reasonable way to make the question more interesting is the following. Recall that, for the purposes of this section, I have taken W to consist of the 2 n worlds characterized by the n binary random variables in X . Let PL D,⊗,⊕ consist of all cps's of the form (W, F, F ′ , Pl), where A more interesting question perhaps is to consider the set PL D,oplus,⊗ of all standard algebraic cps's of the form (W, F, F ′ , Pl), where F = 2 W , so that all subsets of W are measurable, the range of Pl is D and Pl is algebraic with respect to ⊕ and ⊗. Thus, for example, PL IN * ,min,+ consists of all conditional ranking functions on W defined from unconditional ranking functions by the construction in Section 2. Since a cps (W, F, F ′ , Pl) ∈ PL D,⊕,⊗ is determined by Pl, I often abuse notation and write Pl ∈ PL D,⊕,⊗ .
With this notation, the question becomes whether a quantitative Bayesian network (G, f ) such that the entries in the cpts are in D determines a unique element in PL D,⊕,⊗ . As I now show, the answer is yes, provided (D, ⊕, ⊗) satisfies some conditions. Characterizing the conditions on (D, ⊕, ⊗) required for this result turns out to be a little subtle. Indeed, it is somewhat surprising how many assumptions are required to reproduce the simple arguments that are required in the case of probability. 
BN2. For all
d ∈ D, (⊤, d), (⊥, d) ∈ D(⊗), (⊥, d) ∈ D(⊕), ⊤ ⊗ d = d, ⊥ ⊗ d = ⊥, and ⊥ ⊕ d = d. BN3. ⊗ distributes over ⊕; more precisely, a ⊗ (b 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ b n ) = (a ⊗ b 1 ) ⊕ · · · ⊕ (a ⊗ b n ) if (a, b 1 ), . . . , (a, b n ), (a, b 1 ⊕· · ·⊕b n ) ∈ D(⊗) and (b 1 , . . . , b n ), (a⊗b 1 , . . . , a⊗b n ) ∈ D(⊕); moreover, (a 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n ) ⊗ b = a 1 ⊗ b ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n ⊗ b if (a 1 , . . . , a n ), (a 1 ⊗ b, . . . , a n ⊗ b) ∈ D(⊕) and (a 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ a n , b), (a 1 , b), . . . , (a n , b) ∈ D(⊗). BN4. If (a, c), (b, c) ∈ D(⊗), a ⊗ c ≤ b ⊗ c, and c = ⊥, then a ≤ b. BN5. If (d 1 , . . . , d k ) ∈ D(⊕) and d 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ d k ≤ d, then there exists (d ′ 1 , . . . , d ′ k ) ∈ D(⊕) such that (d ′ 1 , d), . . . , (d ′ k , d), (d ′ 1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ d ′ k , d) ∈ D(⊗), d i = d ′ i ⊗ d, for i = 1, . . . , k, and d 1 ⊕ · · · d k = (d ′ 1 ⊕ · · · d ′ k ) ⊗ d.
BN6. D(⊕)
is closed under permutations and prefixes, so that if (x 1 , . . . , x k ) ∈ D(⊕) and π is a permutation of (1, . . . , k) 
R2. Suppose Y 1 , . . . , Y n is a topological sort of the nodes in G. Then for all y ∈ {0, 1} n and all
R1 is the obvious analogue of the requirement in the probabilistic case that the entries of the cpt for X, for a fixed setting of X's parents, add up to 1. R2 essentially says that certain terms (the ones required to compute the plausibility of Y = y for Y = Y 1 , . . . , Y n ) are required to be in D(⊗), so that it makes sense to take their product. Since 1] in the case of probability, there is no need to make this requirement explicit. However, it is necessary for other representations of uncertainty.
The following result shows that, as the name suggests, there is a unique cpm that represents a representable quantitative Bayesian network. 
D-Separation
Just as in the case of probability, conditional independencies can be read off the Bayesian network using the criterion of d-separation [Pearl 1988 ]. Recall that a set X of nodes in G = (V, E), is d-separated from a set Y of nodes by a set Z of nodes in G, written d-sep G (X, Y|Z), if, for every X ∈ X, Y ∈ Y, and a trail from X to Y (that is, a sequence (X 0 , . . . , X k ) of nodes in G such that X 0 = X, X k = Y and either (X i , X i+1 ) or (X i+1 , X i ) is a directed edge in G) and a node X i on the trail with 0 < i < k such that either: (a) X i ∈ Z and there is an arrow leading into X i and an arrow leading out (i.e., either
(c) X i is a head to head node (i.e., (X i−1 , X i ), (X i+1 , X i ) ∈ E), and neither X i nor any of its descendants are in Z.
Let Σ G,Pl consist of all statements of the form I rv Pl (X, ND G (X)|Par G (X)). Let PL D,⊕,⊗ be an arbitrary collection of cps's of the form (W, F, F ′ , Pl) where all components other than Pl are fixed, and the plausibility measures Pl all have the same range D of plausibility values. Consider the following three statements:
I rv
Pl (X, Y|Z) is provable from CIRV1-4 and Σ G,Pl .
3. I rv Pl (X, Y|Z) holds for every plausibility measure in PL D,⊕,⊗ compatible with G.
The implication from 1 to 2 is proved in Verma 1986 ].
Theorem 5.7 : Verma 1986 
It is immediate from Theorem 4.5 that the implication from 2 to 3 holds for algebraic cpms. Finally, the implication from 3 to 1 for probability measures is proved in [Geiger and Pearl 1988; Geiger, Verma, and Pearl 1990] . Here I generalize the proof to algebraic plausibility measures. Notice that to prove the implication from 3 to 1, it suffices to show that if X is not d-separated from Y by Z in G, then there is a plausibility measure Pl ∈ PL D,⊕,⊗ such that I rv Pl (X, Y |Z) does not hold. To guarantee that such a plausibility measure exists in PL D,⊕,⊗ , we have to ensure that there are "enough" plausibility measures in PL D,⊕,⊗ in the following technical sense.
contains all products involving d and d ′ of length at most n).
All the domains for the cps's we have considered are easily seen to be rich. I remark that independence and d-separation for various approaches to representing sets of probability measures using Bayesian networks are discussed by Cozman [2000b Cozman [ , 2000a . However, the technical details are quite different from the approach taken here.
Conclusion
I have considered a general notion of conditional plausibility that generalizes all other standard notions of conditioning in the literature, and examined various requirements that could be imposed on conditional plausibility. One set of requirements, those that lead to algebraic cps's, was shown to suffice for the construction of Bayesian networks. Further assuming that the range D of the plausibility measure is a BN-compatible domain suffices for all the more quantitative properties of Bayesian networks to hold and for d-separation to characterize the independencies. It should also be clear that standard constructions like belief propagation in Bayesian networks [Pearl 1988] can also be applied to algebraic cps's with ranges that are BN-compatible, since they typically use only basic properties of conditioning, addition, and multiplication, all of which hold in BN-compatible domains (using ⊕ and ⊗). In particular, these results apply to sets to probability measures, provided that they are appropriately represented as plausibility measures. The particular representation of sets of probability measures advocated in this paper was also shown to have a number of other attractive properties.
Appendix A. Proofs
In this section I give the proofs of Theorems 4.5, 5.6, and 5.10. I repeat the statement of the results for the convenience of the reader.
Proof: Using an easy induction argument, it follows from Alg1 that
If A i ∩Y / ∈ F ′ , then it follows from Acc4 that Pl(A i |Y ) = ⊥. Thus, by CPl3, Pl(X ∩A i |Y ) = ⊥. Using Lemma 3.2, it follows that
as desired. Proof: CIRV1 is immediate from the fact that independence is symmetric.
Notice that if
Thus, the terms arising on the right-hand side of the equation in Lemma A.1 are in Dom(⊕). This means that there is no need to put in parentheses; ⊕ is associative on terms in Dom(⊕).
For CIRV2, suppose that I rv Pl (X, Y ∪ Y ′ |Z). We must show I rv Pl (X, Y|Z). That is, we must show that I Pl (X = x, Y = y|Z = z), for all x, y, and z. This requires showing two things.
2(a). If
for all y ′ ∈ R(Y ′ ). From (4) it follows that
Thus,
From (5) and Lemma A.1, it follows that
Thus, by Lemma 3.2, Alg1, CPl2, and CPl4,
The next step is to apply distributivity (Alg3) to the last line of (6). To do this, we must show that certain tuples are in Dom(⊕) and Dom(⊗), respectively. Since
Moreover, using (5) again and Alg2, it follows that It now follows, using Alg3, (7), and Lemma 3.3, that
Thus, from (6), it follows that Pl(X = x|Y = y ∩ Z = z) = Pl(X = x|Z = z). This completes the proof of 2(b) and CIRV2.
For CIRV3, suppose that I rv Pl (X, Y ∪ Y ′ |Z). We must show that I rv Pl (X, Y|Y ′ ∪ Z). This again requires showing two things:
For 3(a), suppose that X = x∩Y ′ = y ′ ∩Z = z ∈ F ′ . Thus, by Acc3, X = x∩Z = z ∈ F ′ . Since I rv Pl (X, Y ∪ Y ′ |Z), it follows that
for all y ′′ ∈ R(Y). Applying Alg2 to each side of (8), it follows that
Thus, to prove 3(a), it follows from Alg4 that it suffices to show that
But by (8) Thus, to prove 3(b), it suffices to show that Pl(X = x|Y ′ = y ′ ∩ Z = z) = Pl(X = x|Z = z).
Recall that we are assuming that I rv Pl (X, Y ∪ Y ′ |Z). By CIRV2, it follows that I rv Pl (X, Y ′ |Z). Thus, (9) And since I rv Pl (X, Y|Z), it follows that Pl(X = x|Y = y ∩ Z = z) = Pl(X = x|Z = z). Proof: Given (G, f ), suppose without loss of generality that X = X 1 , . . . , X n is a topological sort of the nodes in G. I now define the plasubility measure Pl determined by (G, f ). I start by defining Pl (G,f ) on sets of the form X = x.
It easily follows from Alg2 that if Pl ∈ PL D,⊕,⊗ and Pl(X 1 = x 1 ∩ . . . ∩ X n−1 = x n−1 ) = ⊥, then Pl(X = x) = Pl(X n = x n |X 1 = x 1 ∩ . . . ∩ X n−1 = x n−1 )⊗ Pl(X n−1 = x n−1 |X 1 = x 1 ∩ . . . ∩ X n−2 = x n−2 )⊗ · · · ⊗ Pl(X 2 = x 2 |X 1 = x 1 ) ⊗ Pl(X 1 = x 1 ).
(Since ⊗ in D is assumed to be associative, no parentheses are required here. However, even without this assumption, it follows easily from Alg2 that ⊗ is in fact associative on tuples (a, b, c) of the form (Pl(U 1 |U 2 ), Pl(U 2 |U 3 ), Pl(U 3 |U 4 )), where U 1 ⊆ U 2 ⊆ U 3 ⊆ U 4 , which are the only types of tuples that arise in (11). Associativity will be more of an issue below.) If Pl is compatible to be with G, then in fact Pl(X = x) = Pl(X n = x n | ∩ X j ∈Par G (Xn) X j = x j )⊗ Pl(X n−1 = x n−1 | ∩ X j ∈Par G (Xn−1) X j = x j )⊗ · · · ⊗ (X 1 = x 1 ).
(If Par G (X k ) = ∅, then Pl(X k = x k |∩ X j ∈Par G (X k ) X j = x j ) is just taken to be Pl(X k = x k ).) It is clear from (12) that Pl (G,f ) (X = x) must be d Xn,G,x ⊗ · · · ⊗ d X 1 ,G,x . Note that every subset of W can be written as a disjoint union of events of the form X = x. Thus, if U ∈ F, define Pl (G,f ) (U ) = ⊕ {x:X=x⊆U } d Xn,G,x ⊗ · · · ⊗ d X 1 ,G,x .
